

# Efficient Set Membership Proofs using MPC-in-the-Head

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1656.pdf>

Aarushi Goel (JHU), Mathias Hall-Andersen (Aarhus), **Gabriel Kaptchuk (BU)**, and Matthew Green (JHU)

# Set Membership Statements

$x_1 \in L$  or  $x_2 \in L$  or ... or  $x_\ell \in L$

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$x_1 \in L$  or  $x_2 \in L$  or ... or  $x_\ell \in L$

$R(x_1, w)=1$  or  $R(x_2, w)=1$  or ... or  $R(x_\ell, w)=1$

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$\alpha \in [\ell]$  is the “active branch”

# Set Membership Statements

- Hiding in a crowd

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- Ring Signatures

$\text{Verify}_m(\text{pk}_1, \sigma) = 1$  or  $\text{Verify}_m(\text{pk}_2, \sigma) = 1$  or ... or  $\text{Verify}_m(\text{pk}_\ell, \sigma) = 1$

# Set Membership Statements

- Hiding in a crowd
- Ring Signatures

$\text{Verify}_m(\text{pk}_1, \sigma) = 1$  or  $\text{Verify}_m(\text{pk}_2, \sigma) = 1$  or ... or  $\text{Verify}_m(\text{pk}_\ell, \sigma) = 1$

- Confidential Transactions (ala. Monero or ZCash)

$\text{SpendVerify}(\text{coin}_1, \sigma) = 1$  or ... or  $\text{SpendVerify}(\text{coin}_\ell, \sigma) = 1$

# Our Contributions

- Framework for Efficient Set Membership in MPC-in-the-Head
- Integration into known MPC-in-the-Head
- Applications:
  - Smallest Symmetric PQ ring signatures
  - Extremely Simple RingCT Transactions




# MPC-in-the-head [IKOS07]

Prover<sub>x,w</sub>

Verifier<sub>x</sub>

# MPC-in-the-head [IKOS07]


Prover<sub>x,w</sub>




MPC over Relation Circuit

Verifier<sub>x</sub>


# MPC-in-the-head [IKOS07]




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
# MPC-in-the-head [IKOS07]



# Representation 1: Naive Repetition

$$R(x_1, w)=1 \text{ or } R(x_2, w)=1 \text{ or } \dots \text{ or } R(x_\ell, w)=1$$


- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component



# Representation 1: Naive Repetition

$$R(x_1, w)=1 \text{ or } R(x_2, w)=1 \text{ or } \dots \text{ or } R(x_\ell, w)=1$$

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
$\ell$   $|R|$  gates!



# Representation 2: Equality Check

$R(x_1, w)=1$  or  $R(x_2, w)=1$  or ... or  $R(x_\ell, w)=1$


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# Representation 2: Equality Check

$$R(x_1, w)=1 \text{ or } R(x_2, w)=1 \text{ or } \dots \text{ or } R(x_\ell, w)=1$$

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


$\ell$  equality checks!

# Representation 3: Merkle Tree




$$R(x_1, w)=1 \text{ or } R(x_2, w)=1 \text{ or } \dots \text{ or } R(x_t, w)=1$$


- Witness
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- Circuit Component



# Representation 3: Merkle Tree

$$R(x_1, w)=1 \text{ or } R(x_2, w)=1 \text{ or } \dots \text{ or } R(x_\ell, w)=1$$


-  Witness
-  Public Input
-  Circuit Component



log( $\ell$ ) hashes!


# Our Approach

- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component




# Our Approach

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# Our Approach: 1. Integrate Preprocessing [KKW18]


Preprocessing Coordinator



MPC over Relation Circuit

# Our Approach: 1. Integrate Preprocessing [KKW18]

Preprocessing Coordinator



$a = \text{Com}(\text{Views})$


$\text{Com}(\text{Preprocessing Seeds}),$   
 $\text{Com}(\text{Views})$

MPC over Relation Circuit



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Preprocessing Coordinator



$a = \text{Com}(\text{Views})$


$\text{Com}(\text{Preprocessing Seeds}),$   
 $\text{Com}(\text{Views})$

Preprocessing Challenge  
Views Challenge(s)

MPC over Relation Circuit

# Our Approach: 1. Integrate Preprocessing [KKW18]

Preprocessing Coordinator



$a = \text{Com}(\text{Views})$

$\text{Com}(\text{Preprocessing Seeds}),$   
 $\text{Com}(\text{Views})$





Preprocessing Challenge  
Views Challenge(s)

MPC over Relation Circuit

$\text{Open}(\text{Preprocessing})$   
 $\text{Open}(\text{Views})$

- 1. Verify Correctness of Preprocessing
- 2. Verify Consistency of Views

# Our Approach: 2. Move Set Membership To Privacy Free Preprocessing

-  Witness
-  Public Input
-  Circuit Component
-  Protocol Computation

Online (Validated via Consistency Check)

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
Preprocessing (Validated via. Cut-and-Choose)

Preprocessing for Protocol

$x_1$   $x_2$  ...  $x_t$


# Our Approach: 2. Move Set Membership To Privacy Free Preprocessing

- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component
- Protocol Computation




# Our Approach: 2. Move Set Membership To Privacy Free Preprocessing

- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component
- Protocol Computation




# Our Approach: 3. Getting Soundness and Zero-Knowledge

- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component
- Protocol Computation



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- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component
- Protocol Computation



# Our Approach: 4. Binding Efficiently with Accumulator

- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component
- Protocol Computation

Online (Validated via Consistency Check)

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Preprocessing (Validated via. Cut-and-Choose)

Preprocessing for Protocol

r

Accumulator


Shuffle(  $r+x_1$   $r+x_2$  ...  $r+x_t$  )






# Our Approach: 4. Binding Efficiently with Accumulator

- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component
- Protocol Computation




# Our Approach: 4. Binding Efficiently with Accumulator

- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component
- Protocol Computation




# Our Approach: 4. Binding Efficiently with Accumulator

- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component
- Protocol Computation




# Our Approach: 4. Binding Efficiently with Accumulator

- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component
- Protocol Computation



# Our Approach: 4. Binding Efficiently with Accumulator

- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component
- Protocol Computation




**Shuffle**(  $r+x_1$   $r+x_2$  ...  $r+x_t$  )



# Our Approach: 4. Binding Efficiently with Accumulator

- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component
- Protocol Computation



# NIZK-based PQ Signatures [GMO16, CDGORRSZ17, KKW18]

$\text{NIPoK}\{(sk) : m \text{ and } pk = \text{PRF}_{sk}(0)\}$

# NIZK-based PQ Ring Signatures [KKW18]

$\text{NIPoK}\{(sk, pk') : m \text{ and } pk' = \text{PRF}_{sk}(0) \text{ and } pk' \in \{pk_1, pk_2, \dots, pk_\ell\}\}$

# NIZK-based PQ Signatures [GMO16, CDGORRSZ17, KKW18]

$$\text{NIPoK}\{(sk) : m \text{ and } pk = \text{PRF}_{sk}(0)\}$$

## NIZK-based PQ Ring Signatures [KKW18]


$$\text{NIPoK}\{(sk, pk') : m \text{ and } pk' = \text{PRF}_{sk}(0) \text{ and } pk' \in \{pk_1, pk_2, \dots, pk_\ell\}\}$$

Set Membership






# [KKW18] PQ Ring Signatures



# Our PQ Ring Signatures

- Witness
- Public Input
- Circuit Component
- Protocol Computation



Ring size:	$2^7$	$2^{10}$	$2^{13}$	Assumption
Derler et al. [13]	982 KB	1352 KB	1722 KB	Symmetric Key
Katz et al. [33]	285 KB	388 KB	492 KB	Symmetric Key
<b>This Work</b>	<b>52 KB</b>	<b>56 KB</b>	<b>60 KB</b>	Symmetric Key
Ring size:	$2^3$	$2^6$	$2^{12}$	Assumption
Libert et al. [39]	52 MB	94 MB	179 MB	SIS
Torres et al. [51]	> 124 KB	> 900 KB	61 MB	Ring-SIS
Esgin et al. [14]	41 KB	58 KB	256 KB	M-LWE & M-SIS
<b>This Work</b>	<b>46 KB</b>	<b>50 KB</b>	<b>59 KB</b>	Symmetric Key

# Also in the Paper

- Non-Black Box Integration into existing MPC-in-the-Head protocols
- Super Simple & Efficient PQ RingCT

# Thanks!

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Ring size:	$2^7$		$2^{10}$		$2^{13}$	
	$ \sigma $	$t$	$ \sigma $	$t$	$ \sigma $	$t$
Derler et al. [13]	982 KB	—	1352 KB	—	1722 KB	—
Katz et al. [33]	285 KB	—	388 KB	—	492 KB	—
<b>This Work (Server)</b>	52 KB	126 ms	56 KB	210 ms	60 KB	1980 ms
<b>This Work (Laptop)</b>	52 KB	2163 ms	56 KB	3437 ms	60 KB	16080 ms

Server: Xeon E5-2695 (18 Cores, 2.10 GHz)

Server: Xeon E5-2666 (10 Cores, 2.60 GHz)

Ring/group size:	$2^7$		$2^{10}$		$2^{13}$	
	$ \sigma $	$t$	$ \sigma $	$t$	$ \sigma $	$t$
Derler et al. [21]	982 KB	—	1.35 MB	—	1.72 MB	—
Here	285 KB	2.0 s	388 KB	2.8 s	492 KB	3.6 s
Boneh et al. [12]	1.37 MB	—	1.85 MB	—	—	—
Here	315 KB	2.3 s	418 KB	3.0 s	532 KB	3.8 s

# Super Simple PQ RingCT Transactions

Parts of a PQ RingCT Construction:

1. Demonstrating authorization to spend hidden coin
2. Double-spend protection
3. Output coin well formed
4. Range proofs

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Existing Approaches:

Take independent approaches  
and duct tape together



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Our Approach:

Throw it into a ZK Proof and  
don't worry about it

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# Super Simple PQ RingCT Transactions

Parts of a PQ RingCT Construction:

1. Demonstrating authorization to spend hidden coin (ring signature)
2. Double-spend protection
3. Output coin well formed
4. Range proofs

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# Super Simple PQ RingCT Transactions

## Parts of a PQ RingCT Construction:

1. Demonstrating authorization to spend hidden coin (ring signature)
2. Double-spend protection (LowMC as PRF)
3. Output coin well formed
4. Range proofs

### Existing Approaches:

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### Our Approach:

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# Super Simple PQ RingCT Transactions

## Parts of a PQ RingCT Construction:

1. Demonstrating authorization to spend hidden coin (ring signature)
2. Double-spend protection (LowMC as PRF)
3. Output coin well formed (Trivial addition)
4. Range proofs

### Existing Approaches:

Take independent approaches  
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### Our Approach:

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# Super Simple PQ RingCT Transactions

## Parts of a PQ RingCT Construction:

1. Demonstrating authorization to spend hidden coin (ring signature)
2. Double-spend protection (LowMC as PRF)
3. Output coin well formed (Trivial addition)
4. Range proofs (Do addition without overflow)

### Existing Approaches:

Take independent approaches  
and duct tape together

### Our Approach:

Throw it into a ZK Proof and  
don't worry about it