

Yet Another RSA attack

October 7, 2019

RSA

Let L be a security parameter

1. Alice picks two primes p, q of length L and computes $N = pq$.
2. Alice computes $\phi(N) = \phi(pq) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$. Denote by R
3. Alice picks an $e \in \{\frac{R}{3}, \dots, \frac{2R}{3}\}$ that is relatively prime to R .
Alice finds d such that $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{R}$.
4. Alice broadcasts (N, e) . (Bob and Eve both see it.)
5. Bob: To send $m \in \{1, \dots, N - 1\}$, send $m^e \pmod{N}$.
6. If Alice gets $m^e \pmod{N}$ she computes

$$(m^e)^d \equiv m^{ed} \equiv m^{ed \bmod R} \equiv m^{1 \bmod R} \equiv m$$

Review of RSA Attacks

1. If same e , $e \leq L$. Low- e attack. **Response** Large e .
2. If same e , $m^e < N_1 \cdots N_L$. Low- e attack. **Response** Pad m .
3. NY,NY problem. Leaks info. **Response** Rand Pad m
4. Timing Attacks **Response** Rand Pad time.

Note items 1 and 2:

e same but N 's Different

How about

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Won't bother with a vote, onto the next slide.

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Same N , Rel Prime e 's, 2 People. Example

1. Zelda is sending messages to Alice using $(1147, 341)$
2. Zelda is sending messages to Bob using $(1147, 408)$
3. Note that 341 and 408 are relatively prime. Bad idea?

Zelda sends m to both Alice and Bob. Eve sees

1. $m^{341} \pmod{1147}$
2. $m^{408} \pmod{1147}$

341 and 408 are rel prime

341, 407 are relatively prime. Lets find combo that adds to 1.

$$408 = 1 \times 341 + 67$$

$$341 = 67 \times 5 + 6$$

$$67 = 6 \times 11 + 1$$

$$1 = 67 - 6 \times 11 = 67 - (341 - 67 \times 5) \times 11 = 56 \times 67 - 11 \times 341$$

$$= 56 \times (408 - 341) - 11 \times 341 = 56 \times 408 - 67 \times 341$$

$$1 = 56 \times 408 - 67 \times 341$$

Example Continued

1. Zelda & Alice use: $(1147, 341)$. Zelda & Bob use $(1147, 408)$.
2. Zelda sends m to Alice via $m^{341} \pmod{1147}$.
3. Zelda sends m to Bob via $m^{408} \pmod{1147}$.
4. $1 = 56 \times 408 - 67 \times 341$

Example Continued

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Eve does the following:

- ▶ Find inverse of $m^{341} \pmod{1147}$. We call this m^{-341} .

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Eve does the following:

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- ▶ Compute mod 1147:

$$(m^{408})^{56} \times (m^{-341})^{67} \equiv m^{56 \times 408 - 67 \times 341} \equiv m^1 \equiv m$$

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Wow! Eve found m without factoring.

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$$35 = 5 \times 7 \quad 100 = 2^2 \times 5^2 \quad 126 = 2 \times 3^2 \times 7$$

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Theorem If a, b, c are rel prime then there exists x_1, x_2, x_3 such that $ax_1 + bx_2 + cx_3 = 1$.

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Example $27 \times 35 - 17 \times 100 + 6 \times 126 = 1$

Example Continued

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Eve does the following:

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- ▶ Compute mod 1147:

$$(m^{35})^{27} \times (m^{-100})^{17} \times (m^{126})^6 \equiv m^{27 \times 35 - 17 \times 100 + 6 \times 126} \equiv m^1 \equiv m$$

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2. Zelda is sending messages to Bob using (N, e_2)
3. e_1, e_2 are rel prime (Bad idea!).

Zelda sends m to both Alice, Bob, and Carol. Eve sees

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Caveat if $x_i < 0$ need m^{e_i} to have inverse mod N .

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Recap of What We've Done So Far

We did

1. Concrete example with Zelda sending to 2 people.
2. Concrete example with Zelda sending to 3 people.
3. General case with Zelda sending to 2 people.

We did not do

1. General case with Zelda Sending to 3 people.
2. General case with Zelda Sending to L people.

Work on the L -case is with your neighbor.

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Zelda sends m to A_1, \dots, A_L . Eve sees, for $1 \leq i \leq L$, $m^{e_i} \pmod{N}$.

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Big Caveat How to find x_1, \dots, x_L ? (Next Slide)

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Finding x_1, \dots, x_L

Problem Given e_1, \dots, e_L rel prime, find $x_1, \dots, x_L \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^L x_i e_i = 1$.

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Your thoughts on this?

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What you should be thinking Bill, do an example!

An Example

Recall If a, b rel prime then exists x_1, x_2 , $ax_1 + bx_2 = 1$.

Generalized Let $d = \text{GCD}(a, b)$. Then exists x_1, x_2 , $ax_1 + bx_2 = d$.

Good News Euclidean Alg finds d, x_1, x_2 .

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Good News Euclidean Alg finds d, x_1, x_2y .

35, 100, 126.

1. Find x_1, x_2 such that $35x_1 + 100x_2 = 5$ (5 is GCD of 35 and 100)

$$35 \times 3 - 100 = 5$$

2. Find y_1, y_2 such that $5y_1 + 126y_2 = 1$

$$-25 \times 5 + 126 = 1$$

- 3.

$$-25 \times (35 \times 3 - 100) + 126 = 1$$

$$-75 \times 35 + 25 \times 100 + 1 \times 126 = 1$$

Note This is diff sol then got earlier. There are many solutions.

Algorithm for x_1, x_2, x_3

1. Input e_1, e_2, e_3
2. Find y_1, y_2 such that $e_1y_1 + e_2y_2 = d$ where $d = \text{GCD}(e_1, e_2)$.
3. Find z_1, z_2 such that $dz_1 + e_3z_2 = 1$.
- 4.

$$dz_1 + e_3z_2 = 1$$

$$(e_1y_1 + e_2y_2)z_1 + e_3z_2 = 1$$

$$e_1(y_1z_1) + e_2(y_2z_1) + e_3z_2 = 1$$

5. $x_1 = y_1z_1, x_2 = y_2z_1, x_3 = z_2$

Note Leave general case to the reader.

Advice for Zelda When she uses RSA

Zelda will use RSA with people A_1, \dots, A_L .

Zelda is sending messages to A_i using $(N_i = p_i q_i, e_i)$

1. Either e_i 's different or if all are e , then e large.
2. If all the e 's are the same, pad m so m^e large.
3. Either N_i different or if all are N , e_i 's not rel prime.
4. Randomly pad m for NY,NY problem.
5. Randomly pad time to ward of timing attacks.

Another Attack: Factoring Algorithms

October 7, 2019

Factoring Algorithm Ground Rules

- ▶ We only consider algorithms that, given N , find a non-trivial factor of N .
- ▶ We measure the run time as a function of $\lg N$ which is the *length* of the input. We may use L for this.
- ▶ We count $+$, $-$, \times , \div as ONE step. A more refined analysis would count them as $(\lg x)^2$ steps where x is larger number you are dealing with.
- ▶ We leave out the O-of but always mean O-of
- ▶ We leave out the *expected time* but always mean it. Our algorithms are randomized.
- ▶ I will just give one factoring algorithm now since its point is more advice for Alice and Bob. Will give others later.

Multiplication HS Algorithm is $\lg x^2$ time. Tell Kolmogorov story.

Easy Factoring Algorithm

1. Input(N)
2. For $x = 2$ to $\lfloor N^{1/2} \rfloor$
 If x divides N then return x (and jump out of loop!).

This takes time $N^{1/2} = 2^{L/2}$.

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Goal Do much better than time $N^{1/2}$.

Pollard's $p - 1$ Algorithm for Factoring (1974)

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An Example That Does Not Quite Work

Want to factor 11227.

If p is a prime factor of 11227

1. p divides 11227
2. p divides $2^{p-1} - 1$ (this is always true by Fermat's little Thm)
3. So $\text{GCD}(2^{p-1} - 1, 11227)$ divides 11227.
4. So $\text{GCD}(2^{p-1} - 1 \bmod 11227, 11227)$ divides 11227.

Lets find $\text{GCD}(2^{p-1} - 1 \bmod 11227, 11227)$. Good idea?

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We do not know p :- (If we did know p we would be done.

Making the Example Work

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If p is a prime factor of 11227. We do not know p .

1. p divides 11227
2. p divides $2^{p-1} - 1$ (this is always true by Fermat's little Thm)
3. p divides $2^{k(p-1)} - 1 \pmod{11227}$ for any k
4. Raise 2 to a power that we **hope** has $p - 1$ as a divisor.
5. **Hope** that $p - 1$ has only small factors, say 2,3. that only appear a small number of times, say ≤ 3 .

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Great! We got a factor of 11227 without having to factor!

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4. Raise 2 to a power that we **hope** has $p - 1$ as a divisor.
5. **Hope** that $p - 1$ has only small factors, say 2,3. that only appear a small number of times, say ≤ 3 .

$$\begin{aligned} \text{GCD}(2^{2^3 \times 3^3} - 1 \pmod{11227}, 11227) &= \text{GCD}(2^{2^{16}} - 1 \pmod{11227}, 11227) \\ &= \text{GCD}(1417, 11227) = 109 \end{aligned}$$

Great! We got a factor of 11227 without having to factor!

Why Worked 109 was a factor and $108 = 2^2 \times 3^3$, small factors.

General Idea

Fermat's Little Theorem if p is prime and a is coprime to p then $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$.

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- ▶ p divides $a^{p-1} - 1$ (always)
- ▶ p divides N (our hypothesis)
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Two problems

- ▶ The GCD might be 1 or N . That's okay- we can try another a .
- ▶ **We don't have p .** If we did, we'd be done!

Do You Believe in Hope?

$a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$. So for all k , $a^{k(p-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$.

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How could we **not** get a non-trivial factor?

- ▶ $\text{GCD}(a^M - 1, N) = 1$. So $p - 1$ does not divide M . M needs to have more factors in it.
- ▶ $\text{GCD}(a^M - 1, N) = N$. So $a^M - 1$ has $p - 1$ and $\frac{N}{p-1}$ in it. Need M to have less factors.

Want M to have lots of small factors so avoids prob 1.

Want M to have not so many factors so avoids prob 2.

Do You Believe in Hope?

Hope Want pick M with many small factors, but might adjust.
Let B be a parameter. Will let

$$M = \prod_{q \leq B, q \text{ prime}} q^{\lceil \log_q(B) \rceil}.$$

- ▶ If B is big then gets lots of factors.
- ▶ If B is small then do not get that many factors.
- ▶ Goldilocks Problem—want B that is just right.
- ▶ Can't quite do that. Instead we try a B and then adjust it.

Example of B, M

Let B be a parameter.

$$M = \prod_{q \leq B, q \text{ prime}} q^{\lceil \log_q(B) \rceil}.$$

If $B = 10$

$q = 2$, $\lceil \log_2(10) \rceil = 4$. So 2^4 .

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$$M = 2^4 \times 3^4 \times 5^2 \times 7^2$$

If $p - 1$ only has factors 2, 3, 5, 7, and if 2 appears ≤ 4 times, 3 appears ≤ 4 times, 5 appears ≤ 2 times, 7 appears ≤ 2 times then

$\text{GCD}(a^M - 1, N)$ Will be a multiple of p .

Do You Believe in Hope? The Algorithm

Parameter B and hence also

$$M = \prod_{q \leq B, q \text{ prime}} q^{\lceil \log_q(B) \rceil}.$$

```
FOUND = FALSE
while NOT FOUND
  a=RAND(1,N-1)
  d=GCD(a^M-1,N)
  if d=1 then increase B
  if d=N then decrease B
  if (d NE 1,N) then FOUND=TRUE
output(d)
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FACT B big then runtime Bad but prob works.

FACT Works well if $p - 1$ only has small factors.

In Practice

A rule-of-thumb in practice is to take $B \sim N^{1/6}$.

1. Fairly big so the M will be big enough.
2. Run time $N^{1/6}(\log N)^3$ pretty good, though still exp in $\log N$.
3. **Warning** This **does not** mean we have an $N^{1/6}(\log N)^3$ algorithm for factoring. It only means we have that if $p - 1$ has all factors $\leq N^{1/6}$.

Advice for Zelda When she uses RSA

Zelda will use RSA with people A_1, \dots, A_L .

Zelda is sending messages to A_i using $(N_i = p_i q_i, e_i)$

1. When pick $N_i = p_i q_i$, make sure $p_i - 1$ and $q_i - 1$ have some large factors.
2. Either e_i 's different or if all are e , then e large.
3. If all the e 's are the same, pad m so m^e large.
4. Either N_i different or if all are N , e_i 's not rel prime.
5. Randomly pad m for NY,NY problem.
6. Randomly pad time to ward of timing attacks.