

Variety within Bigotry: From Individual to Systemic Monsterism in *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*

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I. Televised Monster Bigotry

Buffy Summers might be a monster bigot. Bigotry is a heavy charge, but Buffy *kills* demons and vampires, often with little provocation. Further, Buffy is much more reluctant to kill humans, even where there is quite significant provocation. Hence, Buffy draws a clear distinction between humans and monsters, and her distinction places humans in a superior position with monsters in the unenviable and inferior position where it is acceptable to *kill* them. While there are clearly numerous complications over these issues, there is at least a

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prima facie case for Buffy's anti-monster bigotry, which we will refer to as her "monsterism."

Monsterism is a form of speciesism, where speciesism includes any kind of bigotry against another being simply because that being is a member of a different species. Monsterism is challenging because it feels so justified: after all, *they are monsters*. Nevertheless, monsterism can be useful for analysis because monsters happen to not exist. When we confront a fictional kind of bigotry (monsterism), such as represented in a television show (*Buffy the Vampire Slayer*), it can sharpen our philosophical intuitions as these models can more readily highlight facets that our subjective perceptions tend to unconsciously distort.

Bigotry involves presenting different groups as if they exist within a hierarchy (some group is superior and another group is inferior) in a morally problematic fashion. There are many specific forms of bigotry depending on the kinds of groups, ranging from sexism to racism, homophobia, or ageism. While the primary focus here will be on monsterist bigotry, there will be a secondary research focus on what scholars of racial bigotry have argued. Within that scholarly literature on racism, there is a debate over what kind of entity can be racist; we aim to use the theoretical constructs of this debate and apply them more generally to what kind of entity can be bigoted. Is bigotry a feature of individuals (bigots), institutions (such as in institutional racism), or entire societies (such as in systemic racism, or, similarly, the patriarchy)?⁹ Some scholars argue that only individuals can be bigoted: Even if we sometimes talk as if there is institutional bigotry, such talk is simply shorthand for individual bigots working through an institution.¹ Let's refer to this as the "individualist view" because it reduces all bigotry to individuals. Other scholars argue that bigotry must be reserved

for abstract entities, such as institutions or societies, and cannot be placed on individuals.² Let's call these views "anti-individualist."³ Both individualist and anti-individualist views are reductionist in that they reduce the variety of kinds of bigotry.

By examining the trajectory that Buffy takes (both positively and negatively) in terms of her own monsterism, we will make the case for why reductionist views miss important aspects of bigotry and how having a more inclusive, non-reductionist theory of bigotry provides greater guidance for corrective responses towards bigotry. Reductionist views offer a diminished capacity to analyze the wide complexity of bigotry cases we face both in real life and as realistically represented within fiction. Further, a hybrid account, where multiple kinds of bigotry are posited, is necessary to capture the subtle distinctions that inform how to respond specifically to distinct instances of bigotry in real life.

To keep this bigotry analysis well grounded, it will be useful to tether it both with practically driven questions of blame, as well as with rich fictional examples of monsterism from *Buffy*. Our intuitions for determining which entity counts as bigoted can be practically guided by asking, "Whom should we blame?" Asking this 'who's to blame' question with respect to Buffy Summers' bigotry against monsters indicates that sometimes Buffy herself is blameworthy (hence, individual bigotry is real), while other times, her entire society should be blamed instead (hence, systemic bigotry is real). In fact, we will see that Buffy's own trajectory reveals that she moves from a place where systemic bigotry best explains her monsterism, to a place where individual bigotry best explains it.

Insofar as this project reflects on bigotry in *Buffy*, it will rely upon numerous scholars who have examined these issues

in the *Buffy*verse (or the *Buffy+*verse) towards other ends. For instance, Rebecca M. Brown uses Edward Said's theory of Orientalism, along with related theories, to analyze the positive and negative representations of colonial discourse in *Firefly* and *Serenity*.⁴ Further, Jessica Hautsch examines the representations of vampires in *Buffy* to establish a problematic colonial discourse in *Buffy* and friends' treatment of vampires as the ethnic Other.⁵ Similarly, Kent A. Ono examines vampires on *Buffy* as being racially marginalized just as he argues that the characters played by actors of color are similarly relegated in racially problematic fashions.⁶ Mary Ellen Iatropoulos and Lowery A. Woodall III also analyze the various ways that these shows exhibit institutional racism.⁷ Moreover, other scholars have explained how racial hierarchies are upheld in this verse, such as in discussions over the problematic representations of figures such as Kendra⁸ or the Reavers.⁹

Our essay builds on these prior analyses, but with a distinct hope of using *Buffy* to better understand the many subtle complications within bigotry. Once we see this greater complexity within bigotry, we will come to understand that our corrective responses to bigotry can be misled because we have reduced and oversimplified the theoretical foundations. Once we comprehend the stark divide between individual bigotry and systemic bigotry, we will no longer think that a systemic response could fit an individualist problem, any more than an individualist response could fit a systemic problem.

II. Types of Bigotry

Bigotry has three main components: (a) It presents some identity distinction (such as race, gender, sexuality, monster-status, etc.) as meaningfully real; (b) it presents the distinction within a hierarchy (where being a member of one identity type

is superior to being a member of another type); and (c) this hierarchy is morally problematic. In short, bigotry is a manner of supporting hierarchal identity distinctions when it is morally wrong to do so. Specific forms of bigotry would include racism, sexism, homophobia, etc., insofar as each of these takes an identity type (race, sex/gender, sexuality, etc.) and presents it as if it exists within a hierarchy, where one group is superior to another, and where this presentation is morally problematic.

There is significant debate, such as in the philosophy of race literature, over *how* bigotry *supports* an identity distinction as hierarchal. In cognitive theories, bigotry represents the relevant hierarchal claims through beliefs, thoughts, ideologies, or other cognitive activities.¹⁰ For instance, racism could involve believing in the inferiority of some races. There are also affective theories where bigotry presents hierarchy through feelings, emotions, or other affective states.¹¹ For example, homophobic persons may fear or hate LGBTQIA+ persons. There are also behavioral theories where bigotry is presented through actions that treat the identity in a hierarchal way.¹² Speciesists may kill other species for fun.

These common philosophical theories implicitly prioritize individualist perspectives. Cognitive states, affective states, and intentional behaviors are all characteristics of individuals, and do not easily translate to institutions or societies. This fact has led to adopting individualist accounts because such accounts best match these definitions. For instance, philosopher Tommie Shelby offers a cognitive theory of racism where racism is defined through the development and spreading of ideologies.¹³ For Shelby, an institution cannot directly be racist since racism requires holding ideological beliefs though an institution could be racist indirectly if individuals use the institution to spread their ideology.¹⁴

Similarly, philosopher Jorge L. A. Garcia supports affective understandings of racism¹⁵ but argues that institutions can only be racist insofar as individuals infect the institutions with their racist feelings.¹⁶ Yet other scholars accept that the definitions of individual bigotry need not limit our understandings of institutional or systemic bigotry.¹⁷

In the brief definition provided here, bigotry is normatively loaded as immoral. Contrary to this view, some theorists argue that bigotry should not be considered immoral by definition since we can imagine societies where identity distinctions were somehow accurate or beneficial, and so bigotry would be neutral or even good in such societies. For these theorists, it is a discovery (albeit likely an easy one) that bigotry is immoral in the real world.¹⁸ Other theorists agree that bigotry is immoral by definition.¹⁹ Bigotry should be understood as inherently immoral because accurate and beneficial identity distinctions are not bigotry. For instance, it would be wrong to call it bigotry to consider smarter people as more ideally fitted to be doctors or taller people to be more ideally fitted for basketball (all else equal in both cases). Such neutral, beneficial, and/or accurate identity distinctions are simply different sorts of things than bigotry, which should be considered immoral by definition.

The next thing to cover about bigotry concerns the key issue of what types of things can be the source of bigotry, which leads to a potential variety of bigotry types: individual, institutional, structural, systematic, and systemic bigotry. Before briefly examining these accounts, it is necessary to note that even scholars rarely distinguish these terms (institutional, structural, systematic, and systemic) in clear ways, and they often use them interchangeably in confusing fashions.²⁰ And even though these terms are becoming more popular within

everyday discourse, we must be careful to not rely on ordinary usage, since it can be even less meticulous.²¹

While reductionists deny that there are multiple types of bigotry instantiated in this sense, we can still conceptually distinguish them. First, individual bigotry occurs when individuals are bigoted, such as when Buffy assumes that Principal Wood is from the 'hood simply because he is black.²² Institutional bigotry refers to bigotry that occurs at an institutional level, such as with businesses, schools, governmental agencies, non-governmental agencies, etc. For instance, the Watchers Council forces women into hazardous service without meaningful consent, which would be institutional sexism. Structural bigotry exists when bigotry derives from a larger social structure – an abstract section of society such as the economy, the law, academia, etc. For example, we could note that sci-fi/fantasy fiction is fatphobic; this structural bigotry is widespread throughout the genre. Systematic bigotry involves systems that have been arranged to advance bigoted purposes, such as the Rossum Corporation's organizing a classist business operation that preyed on desperate people. We can put aside systematic bigotry as it adds little to the larger discussion since it is fully explainable through individual and institutional bigotry insofar as it involves systems of bigotry that would be organized either by individuals or within institutions.²³ Finally, systemic bigotry would imply that an entire society is thoroughly plagued by bigotry, such as the entire Buffyverse being infused with prejudices against monsters.

Each term can be understood through the entity that primarily deserves blame for the bigotry. If bigotry involves presenting a morally wrongful identity distinction, then it is inherent that someone or something deserves blame for

presenting that wrongful distinction. Hence, we can distinguish these types of bigotry by whom (or what) deserves the blame. For individual bigotry, it is the individual who deserves blame for their bigotry. For example, throughout *Buffy* and *Angel*, various individuals describe the Romani people as dirty or scam artists; these characters are blameworthy for their individual bigotry against the Romani people.²⁴

Institutional bigotry occurs when the bigotry is inherent to an institution in such a way that when a new person joins the institution, that person merely plays out their bigoted institutional role. For instance, the Watchers Council can be seen as an inherently sexist institution. The Watchers have various tasks that they perform that may make sense in the context of teaching potential Slayers to fight monsters. Yet in performing their jobs, the Watchers inevitably become controlling and ultimately hinder the Potentials to make their own decisions and develop their own viewpoints. The role of the Watcher essentially devolves into disrespecting the autonomy of the Potentials, largely because distrust of young women is built into the institution. Does that mean that each Watcher is being sexist when he or she takes on the job? While one could argue the point, it is at least plausible that the Watchers are placed into sexist institutional roles for which we must blame the institution, at least initially (at a certain point, each Watcher becomes responsible for his or her own sexist behavior). Hence, on this understanding, the Watchers Council exhibits institutional bigotry.²⁵

It is possible that individual bigotry causally precedes institutional bigotry in most cases. Most likely the Shadowmen, whose descendants later created the Watchers Council, were sexist first, and so this institutional bigotry began with a prior, causally connected individual bigotry. Yet it can be necessary

to analyze kinds of bigotry at specific moments in time without having to determine the entire history first. Part of this need is epistemically practical: it is not always feasible to demand knowledge of where bigotry started. More importantly, morally assigning blame rarely requires a full history, as the most relevant factors are typically closer to the present. In a murder case, it could be relevant why the murderer turned out as they did, but we do not have to know their family history to know that they deserve blame. What the Shadowmen did in prehistoric times does not best explain the bigotry that infects the Watchers in the 21st century.

Structural bigotry occurs when bigotry has spread throughout social structures, such as the economy, the movie industry, the criminal justice system, etc. Let's contrast three different examples of transphobia. In the first, a filmmaker refuses to hire trans actors or crew for their films and makes overtly bigoted trans jokes on social media. This case would be individual bigotry as the filmmaker is clearly blameworthy for their bigotry. In the second case, there is a specific movie company that never hires trans actors, and let's assume no one is entirely sure why not. Filmmakers hired into this company assume that they would be fired if they hired trans actors. Suppose the company does fire filmmakers who hire trans actors, but this happens rarely enough that no one is sure if there is a connection. Finally, suppose that the company executives are unaware of the issue as no one wants to bring it up to them. This case would best fit as institutional bigotry as the movie company is transphobic, but there are no clear individuals who are responsible for it. Finally, consider the case where pretty much no one in the entire movie industry hires trans actors, and filmmakers fear that bigoted audiences would react poorly, and they would lose their careers if they hired

trans actors. In this case, transphobia has spread throughout the entire film industry. This case is structural bigotry since it is neither individual filmmakers nor specific movie companies endorsing the bigotry, but instead the bigotry is endemic to the entire movie industry. In this third case, transphobia is simply a property of the film industry, and so it would be structural bigotry.

Let's turn finally to systemic bigotry, where the bigotry is widespread through various individuals, institutions, and social structures in one society. Systemic bigotry is not just taken for granted: it is universalized, deeply foundational, and seemingly unquestionable: It provides the framework for how the entire society thinks and acts. Consider analogously the fact that people breathe air when outside. People do not stop to question whether they *should* breathe air outside. They just take it for granted that of course they breathe air. Someone may tell them that they should not just assume that it is safe to breathe the air, but even hearing that is strange. There is a framework bias that obviously you should just breathe air.

It is best to associate systemic bigotry with the kinds of biases over which the individual lacks control. We should not blame individuals for such biases when they do not know they have them, they do not realize they are acting on them, and the work required to reveal the bias is greater than we can reasonably expect the individual to do. Being an individual bigot requires having sufficient control to be blameworthy for the bigotry.

III. Difficulty of Anti-Individualism in *Buffy+* Scholarship

While we can conceptually distinguish four different kinds of bigotry (individual, institutional, structural, and systemic), reductionists deny that there can be more than one kind. As a

potential example of the difficulty of maintaining such reductionism in the *Buffy+* literature, it is useful to examine the analysis of Mary Ellen Iatropoulos and Lowery A. Woodall III in “Introduction: The Individual, the Institutional and the Unintentional,” which appears in their edited collection, *Joss Whedon and Race: Critical Essays*. Iatropoulos and Woodall claim that “Racism is not about personal antagonism, but rather, about the larger context of a society that rationalizes or minimizes discrimination amidst a legal framework codifying such cultural practices.”²⁶ Here, Iatropoulos and Woodall appear to take an anti-individualist stand as they deny racism should be understood from an individual perspective and instead point to what is likely systemic racism (society-based), in the terminology used here. However, Iatropoulos and Woodall seem to also provide persuasive examples of individual racism based in personal antagonisms. For instance, they point to Angelus as exhibiting racism, they analyze a racist plot by Lindsey McDonald, they describe the racist behavior of zombie police officers, etc.²⁷ The need for more theoretical complexity within bigotry is exhibited by this difficulty of theoretically embracing an anti-individualist position given the strength of individual bigotry examples. Before analyzing this tension further, it is important to note that Iatropoulos and Woodall use their terminology differently, and it will be useful to add an asterisk (*) to their terms to keep track of the distinct usage.

Iatropoulos and Woodall reference an instance where Lindsey tells his client, Russell, that Wolfram & Hart will get Russell off the charge for a murder he actually committed because they can simply frame a “dark-complected man.”²⁸ Iatropoulos and Woodall are entirely correct to point out that this is a clear example of racism,²⁹ but it does not match an anti-individualist perspective. On their view, racism* involves a legal

framework that is codified by cultural practices. As they are analyzing racism through a society where racism includes but extends beyond the entire legal and cultural social structures, they are describing systemic racism, which they refer to as institutional racism* or just racism* simpliciter.³⁰ Yet on our analysis, while there are four distinct instances of racism that are relevant to this complex case, nonetheless it is primarily a case of individual racism.

First and foremost, Lindsey is guilty of individual racism because he is an adult who intentionally chooses to frame a “dark-complected man.” While Lindsey deserves primary blame in this case, Wolfram & Hart endorses this kind of bigoted behavior, which means that Lindsey’s racism takes place within the background of a second instance of racism: Wolfram & Hart’s institutional racism. Despite that institutional racism background, Lindsey’s case is not *primarily* one of institutional racism because his racism is so egregious that Lindsey is not unwittingly fulfilling an institutional role, but rather is making his own decision and deserves the blame.

As a third related kind of racism, Iatropoulos and Woodall note that this example depends upon a realistic legal system where people are much more easily framed because of their race.³¹ Where racism has spread throughout an entire social structure—in this case, the legal system—it is structural racism. But this structural racism is also not primary since Wolfram & Hart knowingly go beyond the already prevalent racism of the legal system of which they are a part (and so they deserve more blame than the system), and Lindsay openly chooses to manipulate the structural racism to benefit his client.

Finally, the fact that it is easier to frame a man of color within the legal system is because there are abundant racial

biases throughout society against men of color. Hence, Lindsey's plan is made easier because of systemic racism (as the term is used here), but again he deserves the primary blame the social availability of racist actions obviously does not justify taking advantage of them.

Thus, each of the four types of racism is relevant to this case, but individual racism is *primary* because Lindsay deserves the most blame for this one instance of racism. Based on this examination, Iatropoulos' and Woodall's case therefore speaks against anti-individualism despite their support for the view. In fact, this case, which involves all four types of racism while ultimately showing that individual racism provides the best explanation, indicates the strong need to break down bigotry further as doing so could help us to pinpoint blame more accurately.

IV. Reductionist Approaches

The individualist approach is concerned that neither an institution, a social structure, nor a society can be bigoted without deriving that bigotry from bigoted individuals. The individualist challenge derives largely from the fact that the tools for analyzing bigotry are lacking in other kinds of bigotry. Let's consider again Jorge L. A. Garcia's individualist position, where Garcia writes on racism based in emotional states, though his points would apply to a general bigotry discussion. For Garcia, an institution can only be racist when it is led by people who have "racial hostility or disregard."³² Garcia believes that individual leadership is necessary to supply the racial animosity or antipathy needed for racism.³³ As another individualist (who is also writing on racism, though again his points would also apply to bigotry more generally), Tommie Shelby believes that racism must be ideological.³⁴ Shelby argues

that the mere fact that an institution harms people of a particular race is insufficient since racism requires that reasoned-out thinking, based in an ideological perspective that sees the other race as inferior, led to the creation of the harm. Since an institution cannot reason (except derivatively through its individual leaders), for Shelby, only individuals can be racist.³⁵ Although they come from competing philosophical perspectives, Garcia and Shelby are each skeptical of institutional racism because institutions lack the attributes (feelings or thoughts, respectively) from which racism derives.

On the other side of reductionist theories, anti-individualists argue against attributing bigotry to individuals.³⁶ One of the main reasons given for this position in the racism literature is that racism, as well as other forms of bigotry, requires power.³⁷ Bigotry requires having sufficient power to cause immense harm to a significant group of people. While some theorists who associate bigotry with power believe there could be individuals with that much power,³⁸ anti-individualists believe that the true impact of bigotry is so large and widespread causing so much oppression and destruction of countless lives that it simply cannot be explained by the choices of one or even many individuals.³⁹ Hence, anti-individualists can only accept institutional, structural, and/or systemic bigotry.

There are some reasons to doubt the strength of the anti-individualists' position. Some individuals have historically played central roles in the development of large-scale oppression. One does not have to say that one individual acted alone to create all the racism that existed in apartheid South Africa, for instance, to note that there were certainly some racist individuals who were actively involved in initiating or maintaining apartheid. Further, even where bigotry is less

severe, it would still be wrong. Even at the early stages of oppression, there would still be reason to blame individual bigots who believed and felt that other races were inferior and initiated oppressive movements, even if those movements did not yet cause immense harm.

There seem to be cases where bigotry is not yet grand enough to require more than individual bigotry. Yet, given the scale of how bad bigotry can become, there is a plausible case for thinking that large-scale bigotry can grow beyond what mere individuals can do. And that would push the case for thinking of bigotry more from an institutional, structural, and/or systemic perspective. By examining examples from *Buffy*, we will see that both types are necessary to explain bigoted phenomena.

V. Against Individualism

Individualists believe that individuals are ultimately to blame for all bigotry. Contrary to this approach, framework biases can be so widespread throughout society that it is not entirely fair to always blame individuals for falling prey to them. In *Buffy*, almost everyone shows biases against monsters, to the extent that the characters take it for granted that it is permissible to slay monsters even while insisting that it is wrong to kill humans. While *Buffy* definitely holds this monsterist double standard, it is in fact so widespread in her society that it is more fair to blame the society than to blame *Buffy*, contrary to individualist theories.

This widespread monsterist double standard is seen clearly in two connected episodes of *Buffy*: “Bad Girls” (3.14) and “Consequences” (3.15). In these Season Three episodes, the two vampire Slayers *Buffy* and *Faith* present two different perspectives that appear to merge in “Bad Girls” before they

more sharply come apart in the continuation episode, “Consequences.” Buffy’s perspective at the beginning of “Bad Girls” is that killing is generally concerning. Even if it needs to be done (and Buffy and the others presume that it does), then it should not be done with glee. In this first phase of the two episodes, Buffy is at least weary of killing demons and vampires (both of whom fall under the open-ended “monsters” term): She is not against it, but she recognizes it as a necessary bad (“necessary evil” would be too strong here since it is not clear that Buffy would think of killing demons as being *evil*). But at the very least, Buffy, unlike Faith, does not see killing demons, in this first phase, as something to take pleasure in.

Eventually these two episodes will center on Faith’s unintentionally killing a human (Deputy Mayor Allen Finch) because her delight in killing monsters spins out of control, which will openly horrify Buffy (and more secretly horrify Faith). Before that happens, we see Buffy and Faith killing monsters with few qualms about doing so. So Buffy starts from the position that killing monsters is a necessary bad, but, in the second phase, she warms up to Faith’s position as they both find ways to take joy in slaying monsters. After some enjoyable vampire killing, Buffy admits openly that the killing “didn’t suck,” which Willow struggles to understand. This leaves Buffy thinking that Willow just cannot appreciate the rush since Willow has yet to experience killing demons.⁴⁰ Buffy is unable to understand Willow’s morally defensible position that *no one* should appreciate killing, which shows Buffy’s descent into indiscriminate violence is based in her unquestioned monsterist bias. Buffy views the world in such a way that it simply does not make sense to her that others do not see monsters the way she and Faith do.

As this is a TV show, later events, in a third phase of the double-episode arc, are likely to shake Buffy of her monsterist reveling in killing, which is what happens—but only up to a point. Once Faith kills the human Allen Finch, Buffy refines her perspective on killing—though primarily on the killing of humans.⁴¹ Killing monsters at most becomes a concern in an indirect or secondary fashion, suggesting more monsterist bias. An analogous indirect moral concern is found within Immanuel Kant's infamous argument for what makes it wrong to purposefully harm nonhuman animals (just "animals" from here on). For Kant, harming animals is not wrong because animals are valuable in their own right—Kant denies that they could be. Instead, Kant argues that harming animals is wrong because a person might get carried away and harm a human.⁴² Buffy is in an analogous position in the third phase: Faith's killing of a human does not teach Buffy a larger lesson against killing, but Buffy has at least observed that Faith's overzealous killing of monsters could potentially lead to a very wrongful killing *of a human*. Hence, killing monsters is not wrongful in itself, but it is something that could get out of control, and that is why Buffy rethinks her general killing position. Buffy is not yet confronting her monsterist bias since she only sees monsters in a secondary position.

To be clear, Kant scholars are reasonably dismayed that Kant had nothing better to say about why it is wrong to harm animals, and much work has been done to try to resurrect his moral perspective on animals.⁴³ Kant's view is speciesist as it denies that animals have value in their own right. Kant argues against mistreating animals, but Kant gives no concern for animals in themselves, and he would be fine with harming them if we could simply ensure that doing so would never end up hurting a human. Kant very well could have the same position

about stuffed animals if harming stuffed animals showed a propensity to harm humans.

Buffy is likewise only questioning her gleeful killing of monsters because she might accidentally kill a human, not because of the wrong of gleefully killing monsters. On the one hand, she takes it as a cardinal rule that no humans should be killed, at least not by the Slayer, no matter how evil they are. On the other hand, even if Buffy learns not to take delight in killing demons, she also has no hesitation in killing them regardless of whether they have proven to deserve to die. These views are rife with inconsistency: a human's life cannot be taken no matter how evil they have proven themselves to be, while a vampire can be murdered immediately upon their very rebirth even if they have done nothing wrong yet.

Before placing blame for this monsterist double standard, whether on Buffy or on her society, it is useful to consider an earlier episode (Season Two's "Lie to Me," 2.7) where Buffy kills Billy "Ford" Fordham, her old friend from LA.⁴⁴ Ford has pursued turning into a vampire to escape death from cancer, but Buffy explains that his plan will not work because once Ford dies, "a demon sets up shop in your old house, and it walks, and it talks, and it remembers your life, but it's not you."⁴⁵ Hence, on Buffy's own view, there are two people here: Ford as a human, and a demon who takes up shop when Ford becomes a vampire. Yet once he turns into a vampire, Buffy immediately stakes him, making no attempt to rehabilitate this new Ford who exists as a vampire. Significantly, it was Ford, *as a human*, who had lied to Buffy for a good part of the episode, betrayed her and turned her over to Spike, and conspired in murdering other humans (all as a trade with Spike for becoming a vampire). But Buffy never kills Ford, the human. Instead, she kills Ford immediately upon his becoming a vampire, which

emphasizes how much Buffy differentiates the human person, whom she will not kill, from the vampire person, whom she can immediately kill, even if that entity has never done anything wrong *as a vampire*.

At the cemetery, as she waits for Ford to rise, we see Buffy processing what has just happened, as she explains to Giles that “I think it made it easier for him [Ford] to be the villain of the piece.... Really, he was just scared.”⁴⁶ Here, Buffy is willing to make an allowance for Ford’s behavior while human she understands that he was desperate to find a solution to his fatal health problem. And she follows up this realization with a heartfelt discourse on her own stance: “Nothing’s ever simple anymore. I’m constantly trying to work it out, who to love or hate, who to trust. It’s just like the more I know, the more confused I get.”⁴⁷ Despite feeling conflicted about Ford the human, who has been quite immoral, Buffy does not consider any option other than immediate death for Ford the vampire, despite her own claim that they are distinct individuals.⁴⁸

While it is abundantly clear that Buffy holds onto a double standard when it comes to killing, the key question is: Who deserves the blame for the monsterism lying behind this lethal double standard? Buffy’s double standard can only *appear* to be consistent to her because she grew up in a society that is marred by systemic monsterism, hence the blame for the double standard will best be placed on the society. Now, in this case, what counts as the “society” is a bit tricky. To a certain extent, Buffy’s most immediate society is made of the various people who know that monsters exist. Amongst those people, there are strongly rooted biases against monsters as many of the non-monsters are strongly in favor of killing the monsters. Yet we can also note that Buffy’s larger society, like our own, has an implicit bias against monsters even if they do not know that they

exist. We tend to embrace narratives where monsters are the villains, where monsters often have neither reasoning nor perspectives that are worthy of our respect, and where monsters should be killed as a matter of course. Even fictionalized monsters are painted with disrespectful and bigoted strokes, creating a routine bias against them both in Buffy's larger society as well as in our own.

Within a society where monsterism is systemic, Buffy may not hold any views that would mark her as a monster bigot because Buffy's views on monsters simply reflect what is considered "normal" in her society. Buffy, like almost every non-monster in her society, simply takes it for granted that it is okay to kill monsters. Their society is plagued by a framework bias where everyone assumes that monsters deserve death. Because of that very background framing, Buffy has not *chosen* any of her anti-monster views knowingly or purposefully. Buffy, like the rest of her society, instead simply assumes that her monster views are unquestionably justified.

Buffy's monsterism in this case exhibits systemic bigotry because Buffy is taking on a widespread social belief (monsters deserve death) that she has never had any reason to question. Consider the difficulty of blaming someone living one thousand years ago for believing that the world was flat. Everyone in their society felt the same way, and there was little reason to question it. This position is not intended to provide an excuse, but it recognizes that wrongful views can be taken for granted, unquestioned, and rendered invisible because they are so normalized. The primary responsibility when an agent acts on a social bigotry that is so widespread that it seems to be unquestionable is not on the agent. It does not make sense to blame the agent where there is no impetus for them to question what they have been taught to take for granted.

Instead, with these widespread social biases, we must place the blame on the whole society. The entire society—individuals, institutions, and social structures included—is responsible for biases that are so thoroughly spread that no particular entity can shoulder the blame since none of them could have worked alone to spread the bias (as it extends beyond the reach of any of them). The anti-individualists are correct to the extent that there are certainly some instances of bigotry that are beyond the power of mere individuals to create. A framework bias that is assumed by people in all aspects of life is just such an instance of bigotry.

It is worth noting here that blame is not zero-sum. The goal is to locate the *primary* blame for instances of bigotry. It is plausible that different people and institutions within a society have some levels of secondary blame for an instance where society has primary blame. Recognizing that society has primary blame for widespread bigoted biases is consistent with the possibility that many individuals have secondary blame as well. This situation would occur where the individual has been brought up under a widespread bias, but either there is some room left where we might expect the individual to question the bias and/or the individual goes somewhat beyond what the widespread bias suggests. The question, which will come up shortly, is whether there is a point where the individual's blame for bigotry becomes primary, contrary to the anti-individualist position.

Buffy lives in a world where monsters are either presented as evil in fiction or the people who know that the monsters exist assume that they are evil. It is inevitable that she will have beliefs and take actions that rely on these monsterist biases. After all, if you grow up in a world that teaches that monsters ought to be hated, then you are going to take it for granted that

you should hate monsters, and you should treat monsters poorly. You may even find yourself making excuses for killing monsters even when you have an absolute prohibition against killing humans. Buffy acts without thought in accordance with the social biases that pervade her society. Early on, it is hard to primarily blame Buffy for her monsterism. Buffy's early monster bigotry is of the systemic, not individual, variety, which disproves individualist theories of bigotry.

VI. Against Anti-individualism

The anti-individualist is a reductionist, like the individualist, but the anti-individualist reduces away individual bigotry. The anti-individualist would agree to the arguments made above in that the widespread monsterist bias could neither have been created nor maintained by individuals. Yet, the anti-individualist would apply that same reasoning to all instances of bigotry as they would deny there could ever be cases where the individual should be considered a bigot.

Against this view, there comes a time when enough has happened such that Buffy should take responsibility for her own lingering bigotry. Such a significant change is less likely to come from a specific concrete thing, and more likely to involve a gradual process involving multiple events that open a person's eyes to the systemic bigotry of which they are partaking. What is necessary to argue against the anti-individualists is simply to be able to point to a moment where the transition from systemic bigotry to individual bigotry—the move from society being primarily to blame to the individual primarily deserving blame—has clearly occurred.

Scholar Jessica Hautsch points to an important conversation in "New Moon Rising" (4.19) where Buffy attacks the position of her then boyfriend, Riley Finn, and the Initiative

for over-generalizing in a fashion that treats all demons as bad.⁴⁹ In that conversation, Buffy points out to Riley, “There are creatures, vampires for example, that aren’t evil at all.”⁵⁰ After all, Buffy has had positive experience with other monsters, such as with Oz, a werewolf, who turns out to be a valuable, contributing member of the Scoobies.⁵¹ Buffy also goes on to have positive experiences with Clem, a loose-skinned demon. Buffy trusts Clem so much that she has him watch over her sister, Dawn, while Buffy is needed elsewhere.⁵² By the seventh season, we see Buffy and Clem hug as close friends.⁵³ With constant, positive interactions with Oz and later Clem, Buffy is right to point out to Riley that monsters are not all evil.

Although Buffy verbalizes the view that not all monsters are evil to Riley, Hautsch points out that Buffy continues to act in a bigoted fashion, especially with respect to Spike.⁵⁴ At this point, we ought to blame Buffy *primarily* for her bigotry as she is able to articulate the problems with monsterism when she witnesses it in Riley, and yet she continues to be monsterist herself. Thus, her bias is no longer precritical, but is one that Buffy has considered, critiqued, and yet still unjustifiably endorses.

Buffy’s conversation with Riley shows that the transition from systemic bigotry to individual bigotry has occurred. Early on, Buffy implicitly takes on the bias against monsters that is rampant in her society. The more experiences that Buffy has with monsters, the more the primary blame gradually transitions to being hers. With more experiences and knowledge, individuals can reasonably be expected to confront and possibly overcome their biases. By the time Buffy has this conversation with Riley, she has developed sufficient knowledge to critique Riley. Therefore, she has enough knowledge that she is now primarily responsible for

overcoming her own monsterist biases. Buffy's remaining bigotry is now individual bigotry since she can be reasonably expected to know better. Buffy, at this point, is an individual bigot.

In opposition to this position, there may be a potential explanation for Buffy's behavior that undercuts her alleged individual bigotry. Renée Cox and, later, Jessica Hautsch each argued that Buffy acts on an implied principle that the soul makes someone worthy of humane treatment, while the lack of a soul means the being deserves no respect.⁵⁵ One might think that monsterism is an improper example of bigotry because monsters, especially insofar as they lack souls, *deserve* to be treated as different from, and even worse than, humans. More significantly, regardless of whether this position is objectively fair, it might be subjectively reasonable from Buffy's perspective. That is, given what a particular person knows about the world, provided that they are putting in a reasonable amount of effort to learn the relevant facts, it could be reasonable for them to feel certain ways that might otherwise seem wrongful. If Buffy *reasonably* believes that having a soul provides a relevant basis for identity discrimination, then she would not be wrong for discriminating against monsters. There is a legitimate question of whether Buffy's soul-based principle could allow her to avoid charges of monsterism and could lead to a questioning of whether monsterism is properly bigotry at all.

Assessing Buffy's potential exception to the bigotry charge hence requires assessing the soul-based principle. Following the work of other scholars, Dean A. Kowalski distinguishes four theories of the soul in *Buffy* and *Angel*, and we will be able to use these theories to assess Buffy's soul-principle.⁵⁶ Based on the work of Gregory Stevenson, the first

theory is the ontological theory that takes the soul to be a real thing that has the fantastical power of making morality possible for those persons who have it.⁵⁷ It is then a consequence of this view that the monsters who lack a soul are incapable of morality. Monsters, then, would be inherently dangerous and it would appear to be much easier to justify killing them.

It is not necessary for the work here to determine which theory of the soul provides the most accurate depiction of how the soul works within *Buffy*. It is instead important to determine whether any of the theories would permit Buffy to kill monsters without being a bigot for doing so. It is useful to assume the ontological theory is correct, for now, to ask whether that would allow Buffy to be an exception to bigotry charges. At first blush, it appears to help because Buffy is simply reacting to a real fact of her world: monsters have no souls, they are inherently dangerous, and so they must be dealt with.

Contrary to this position, it is not clear that moral agents gain unlimited warrant to treat creatures with no moral regard even if those creatures are both incapable of moral action and are potentially dangerous. Consider humans who are biologically unable to understand or engage in moral activity. Some of these humans may be capable of danger to themselves or others. It is obviously not permissible to treat them as inferior, and it is horrendous to think that it would be acceptable to kill them simply because they could at some point be dangerous.

Perhaps it may seem to be more controversial whether we can kill nonhuman animals who are both incapable of morality and potentially dangerous. There are two problems with such a response. First, this response is essentially speciesist since it attempts to treat animals as inferior to humans who are in the same situation. Since it is absolutely unacceptable to treat

certain humans as inferior because they are incapable of morality and potentially dangerous, it would be speciesist to treat animals as inferior in that situation. Monsterism is a form of speciesism, so this same argument would show that monsters who are incapable of morality and potentially dangerous cannot be treated worse than humans and nonhuman animals in the same situation.

The second problem with this response is that it is just wrong, especially in terms of killing. It is not morally acceptable to kill all lions, tigers, and bears just because they are incapable of morality and potentially dangerous. Well, one might worry, aren't monsters *much more* dangerous than lions, tigers, and bears? Perhaps they are. But that does not change the moral parameters of the situation, which requires that one only kill as a last resort, which is not what Buffy typically does with respect to monsters.

If the soul is a real thing and its lack means that monsters are incapable of morality, then they are still owed moral consideration. Their incapacity to be moral means that we cannot blame them for their behavior. If lacking a soul means monsters must be immoral, then they are in fact not immoral at all. If the soul is real, then monsterism is bigoted.

Another theory of the soul, which Stacey Abbott supports, is the existentialist theory where the soul is more metaphorical and represents the choices that we make to be moral.⁵⁸ On this view, the soul is not a fantastical entity that enables morality, but instead lies in the choices that a person makes to create themselves. Monsters may be less likely to make themselves into moral agents—they instead tend to choose selfishly. *Buffy* and *Angel* provide notable exceptions, such as Angel and Spike, who, on this existential view, do not gain an

ontologically existing soul, but instead make life choices such that they form themselves into moral agents.

On this view, Buffy's monsterist bigotry is even clearer. On this view, any given monster could choose to become good. Even if there are various reasons that make this choice harder for monsters, it would be incumbent on moral agents to give them a chance. When Buffy *kills* them, she has ended any chance for them to turn around and choose to be good. Hence, her bigotry is inescapable on this view.

Kowalski provides two more theories of the soul that would be considered more hybrid views attempting to find middle ground between the existentialist and ontological theories. First, on Scott McLaren's view, the soul is a thing (similar to the ontological view), but it merely assists with moral action, as opposed to being entirely necessary for morality.⁵⁹ Hence, for McLaren, it is possible, but simply much harder for monsters to be moral, given that they lack a soul. Second, on Kowalski's own view, the soul is a theoretical entity—that is, it is an entity whose existence must be posited to explain observed phenomena.⁶⁰ A theoretical entity is what scientists use when they cannot explain some observed phenomena unless they assume the existence of some other entity—thus, the entity exists in theory because of its necessity to explain what we know about the world. In this case, we posit that within the Buffyverse, there must be a soul that enables some creatures (such as humans and ensouled vampires) to be moral heroes and engage in complete self-sacrifice, but whatever the soul is, it is not absolutely necessary for monsters to be moral.⁶¹

On either hybrid theory of the soul, monsters *could be moral*. Therefore, neither theory would provide a justification for treating monsters as inferior to souled creatures, such as humans, and neither theory would acquit Buffy for killing

monsters. On each of these theories, monsters either deserve a chance (as they do on the existential and hybrid theories), or they must be treated differently in a way that remains as humane as possible (on the ontological theory). So, Buffy comes out as a bigot on all these theories of the soul.

An anti-individualist would disagree with the conclusion that Buffy is a bigot because Buffy lacks the kind of power to have primary responsibility for bigotry. Nevertheless, it is important to make a distinction between blame for the consequences of bigotry and blame for the bigotry itself. A significant amount of power is necessary to cause bigotry's grave and widespread consequences. No individual, no matter how powerful they may be, could cause bigotry's most terrible consequences, such as entire systems of oppression. Yet, a person could entirely deserve the blame for *their own contribution* to bigotry, no matter how insignificant their bigotry might be in the bigger picture of society-wide oppression. Buffy not only holds monsterist views, she *kills* monsters. Once she has become aware that some monsters are not evil, then Buffy deserves blame for every horrible thing she herself does to monsters. Buffy is an individual bigot as she should know better, and it cannot save her from blame that she did not cause monsterism by herself.

Buffy is an individual monsterist bigot at least since the conversation with Riley. That does not entail that Buffy is a bigot with respect to all monsters — she has positive interactions with Oz, Clem, and others. Of course, having a few friends of one group certainly does not preclude being otherwise bigoted against that group. It also does not mean that systemic monster bigotry has gone away, but that it is no longer *primary* in *Buffy's wrongs*. Buffy henceforth deserves primary blame for her own bigotry. When it was more society's fault, Buffy's behavior

exhibited systemic bigotry. When it becomes more her fault, Buffy exhibits individual bigotry. That is why we need both concepts, contrary to either reductionist approach. The individualist approach is challenged when society at large shoulders the primary blame. The anti-individualist approach is challenged when an individual deserves primary blame for their own contributions to bigotry.

VII. Embracing Complications

The changing nature of Buffy's monsterism establishes why it is useful to distinguish individual and systemic bigotry. Buffy has consistently held that it is always wrong to kill humans, but she shows no restraint in killing monsters even when they have yet to do a single wrongful action. This morally inconsistent position exhibits monsterism. Yet were we to analyze Buffy's bigoted history through only one kind of bigotry either individual or systemic, as different reductionist scholars would recommend then we would miss something in our analysis.

Without systemic bigotry, we would have a hard time explaining Buffy's earlier monsterism when the blame seems to fall on society more than on Buffy. The blame falls more on the society because the bigoted beliefs are neither something Buffy developed on her own, nor something Buffy knowingly chose to take on. Instead, they are widespread social beliefs that almost everyone in the society takes on without even realizing it. So we must blame the society that created, promoted, and spread the bigoted bias. The concept of systemic bigotry allows us to make sense of blaming a society when it is not just one person or a group of people spreading the bias but is instead a joint effort by multiple social entities.

While systemic bigotry makes sense as an explanation for her early monsterism, Buffy eventually arrived at a moment

when she is entirely capable of articulating what is wrong with the bigotry that she herself has shared. Perhaps Buffy does not recognize that she shares the monsterism that she saw in her boyfriend, Riley. Nevertheless, Buffy could reasonably be expected to critique the bigotry in herself that she saw in Riley. From that point, Buffy is an individual bigot because she deserves the blame for her own monsterist thoughts and actions. Systemic bigotry is not enough of an explanation—we also need to incorporate individual bigotry in our larger analysis.

It is then incumbent on us to keep both the theories of individual and systemic bigotry, as they are imbricated in the process of bias-making. These sorts of complications help us to better analyze bigotry. By understanding bigotry as a complex malady that takes various forms, including individual and systemic bigotry, we come to realize that how we respond to bigotry depends on which form it takes. Hence, we can use the understanding we gain from fiction to develop more practically effective corrective responses in the real world. Where bigotry is systemic, then we must respond with society-wide measures. It is of little use to challenge one person's framework biases, especially once it is clear that they are unable to question them. Instead, framework biases must be challenged at fundamental levels throughout society, within education, culture, politics, law, etc. By identifying that it is systemic bigotry at work, we see that only a systemic response will help.

But where bigotry is individual, then it is not only accurate to blame the individual, but also the remedy must address the individual. For instance, if a person's bigoted views are idiosyncratic or go well beyond what is widespread in a society, then we must blame that person more than the educational system or the culture. And, in such a case, our

corrective responses must focus on that specific person, helping them learn better or addressing their mistaken beliefs or stray feelings directly. Whether dealing with the problematic bigotry of individuals or society-wide bigotry, thinking about Buffy's monsterism teaches us how we can help fight monstrous behaviors in real life.

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Notes

¹ Fred Pincus, "From Individual to Structural Discrimination," *Race and Ethnic Conflict: Contending Views on Prejudice, Discrimination, and Ethnoviolence*, edited by Fred Pincus and Howard Ehrlich (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994); Jorge L.A. Garcia, "The Heart of Racism," in *Racism: Key Concepts in Critical Theory*, edited by Leonard Harris (Humanity Books, 1999), 404-405; Jorge L.A. Garcia, "Philosophical Analysis and the Moral Concept of Racism," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 25.5 (1999), 17; Jorge L.A. Garcia, "Racism and Racial Discourse," *The Philosophical Forum* XXXII.2 (2001), 136; Jorge L.A. Garcia, "Three Sites for Racism: Social Structures, Valuing, and Vice," in *Racism in*

Mind, edited by Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, 35–55 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Tim J. Berard, “The Neglected Social Psychology of Institutional Racism,” *Sociology Compass* 2.2 (2008), 734–764.

² Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation,” *American Sociological Review* 62.3 (1997), 467, 474; Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America* (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 2006), 175 fn. 37; Sara Ahmed, *On Being Included: Racism and Diversity in Institutional Life* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 43–45.

³ As a terminological matter, it will be useful to distinguish “anti-individualist” from “non-individualist.” Non-individualist is an open-ended term that could include either anti-individualists, who believe individuals cannot be bigots, or views that deny the individualist position that only individuals can be bigoted by allowing for multiple forms of bigotry, including individual bigots. Hence, non-individualism is an umbrella group that includes anti-individualism.

⁴ Rebecca M. Brown, “Orientalism in *Firefly* and *Serenity*,” *Slayage* 7.1, Winter 2008. Available at https://www.whedonstudies.tv/uploads/2/6/2/8/26288593/brown_slayage_7.1.pdf (accessed 20 January 2023).

⁵ Jessica Hautsch, “‘What the Geisha has Gotten Into You?:’ Colorblindness, Orientalist Stereotypes, and the Problem of Global Feminism in *Buffy the Vampire Slayer* Season Eight,” *Slayage* 12.2/13.1, Winter 2015/Spring 2015. Available at http://www.whedonstudies.tv/uploads/2/6/2/8/26288593/hautsch_slayage_12.2-13.1.pdf (accessed 20 June 2022). Also related to colonialist dynamics, see Jessica Hautsch, “Staking Her Colonial Claim: Colonial Discourses, Assimilation, Soul-making, and Ass-kicking in *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*,” *Slayage*, 9.1, Spring 2011. Available at

https://www.whedonstudies.tv/uploads/2/6/2/8/26288593/hautsch_slayage_9.1.pdf (accessed 19 June 2022).

⁶ Ono Kent A., “To Be a Vampire on *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*: Race and (‘Other’) Socially Marginalized Positions on Horror TV,” in *Fantasy Girls: Gender in the New Universe of Science Fiction and Fantasy Television*, edited by Elyce Rae Helford (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 163–186.

⁷ Mary Ellen Iatropoulos and Lowery A. Woodall III, “Introduction: The Individual, the Institutional and the Unintentional,” edited by Mary Ellen Iatropoulos and Lowery A. Woodall III, *Joss Whedon and Race: Critical Essays* (McFarland, 2016). Kindle Edition, Introduction.

⁸ Lynne Edwards, “Slaying in Black and White: Kendra as Tragic Mulatta in Buffy,” in *Fighting the Forces: What’s at Stake in Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, edited by Rhonda V. Wilcox and David Lavery (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 85–97.

⁹ Agnes B. Curry, "We Don't Say 'Indian': On the Paradoxical Construction of the Reavers," *Slayage* 7.1, 2008; J. Douglass Rabb and Michael Richardson, "Reavers and Redskins: Creating the Frontier Savage," in *Investigating Firefly and Serenity: Science Fiction on the Frontier*, edited by Rhonda V. Wilcox and Tanya R. Cochran (I. B. Tauris, 2008), 127–138.

¹⁰ Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Racisms," in *Anatomy of Racism*, edited by David Theo Goldberg, 3–17 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990); Anthony Skillen, "Racism: Flew's Three Concepts of Racism," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 10.1 (1993), 75; Tommie Shelby, "Is Racism in the 'Heart'?" *Journal of Social Philosophy* 33.3 (2002), 415–416.

¹¹ Jorge L.A. Garcia, "The Heart of Racism," in *Racism: Key Concepts in Critical Theory*, edited by Leonard Harris (Humanity Books, 1999); Jorge L.A. Garcia, "Philosophical Analysis and the Moral Concept of Racism," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 25.5 (1999). Jorge L.A. Garcia, "Racism and Racial Discourse," *The Philosophical Forum* XXXII.2 (2001).

¹² Michael Philips, "Racist Acts and Racist Humor," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 14.1 (1984); Antony Flew, "Three Concepts of Racism," *International Social Science Review* 68.3 (1993), 100; Shirley Better, *Institutional Racism* (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 2008), 10.

¹³ Tommie Shelby, "Is Racism in the 'Heart'?" *Journal of Social Philosophy* 33.3 (2002), 415–416; Tommie Shelby, *Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016).

¹⁴ Shelby, "Is Racism in the 'Heart'?" 417.

¹⁵ See note 10.

¹⁶ Jorge L.A. Garcia, "Three Sites for Racism: Social Structures, Valuings, and Vice," in *Racism in Mind*, edited by Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, 35–55 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 44–47, 51.

¹⁷ For instance, see: Colin Wight, "The Agent-Structure Problem and Institutional Racism," *Political Studies* 51 (2003), 713–718; Sally Haslanger, "Oppressions: Racial and Other," in *Racism in Mind*, edited by Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2004); Marlisa Moschella, "When Racism Goes Institutional: A Defense of Institutional Racism in the Face of Individualist Criticisms," MA thesis (University of Colorado, 2007); Shirley Better, *Institutional Racism* (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 2008), 13, 41; John A. Powell, "Structural Racism: Building upon the Insights of John Calmore," *North Carolina Law Review* 86.3 (2008), 795; Andrew J. Pierce, "Structural Racism, Institutional Agency, and Disrespect," *Journal of Philosophical Research* 39 (2014), 28–34.

¹⁸ Tommie Shelby, "Is Racism in the 'Heart'?" *Journal of Social Philosophy* 33.3 (2002), 412; Charles W. Mills, "'Heart' Attack: A Critique of Jorge Garcia's Volitional Conception of Racism," *The Journal of Ethics* 7.1 (2003), 34, 58–59.

¹⁹ Jorge L.A. Garcia, "The Heart of Racism," in *Racism: Key Concepts in Critical Theory*, edited by Leonard Harris (Humanity Books, 1999), 399, 403; Lawrence Blum, "Moral Asymmetries in Racism," in *Racism and Philosophy*, edited by Susan E. Babbitt and Sue Campbell (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 80; Lawrence Blum, *I'm Not a Racist, But: The Moral Quandary of Race* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 1–32, esp. 27–28; Joshua Glasgow, "Racism as Disrespect," *Ethics* 120 (2009), 77–80; Naomi Zack, "Race and Racial Discrimination," in *The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics*, edited by Hugh LaFollette, accessed 17 July 2020 from Oxford Handbooks Online: www.oxfordhandbooks.com (2009), 2–4.

²⁰ Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation* (New York: Vantage Books, 1992), 41–42; Pincus, "From Individual to Structural Discrimination," 83–84; Haslanger, "Oppressions"; Moschella, "When Racism Goes Institutional," 59; Kimberly A. Griffin, Meghan J. Pifer, Jordan R. Humphrey, and Ashley M. Hazelwood, "(Re)Defining Departure: Exploring Black Professors' Experiences with and Responses to Racism and Racial Climate," *American Journal of Education* 117.4 (2011), 499; Joe Feagin and Zinobia Bennefield, "Systemic Racism and U.S. Health Care," *Social Science & Medicine* 103 (2014), 7; Garner, *Racisms: An Introduction*, 115, 126; Angela Wangari Walter, Yvonne Ruiz, Robbie Welch Christler Tourse, Helene Kress, Betty Morningstar, Bet Macarthur, and Ann Daniels, "Leadership Matters: How Hidden Biases Perpetuate Institutional Racism in Organizations," *Human Service Organizations: Management, Leadership & Governance* 41, no. 3 (2017), 216.

²¹ Shelby, "Is Racism in the 'Heart'?", 413; Alberto G. Urquidez, "What Accounts of 'Racism' Do," *Journal of Value Inquiry* 52 (2018).

²² "Help," *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 7, Episode 4, Mutant Enemy, written by Rebecca Rand Kirshner, directed by Rick Rosenthal, Twentieth Century Fox, aired 15 October 2002.

²³ Systematic and systemic are often confused, and so it was necessary to at least mention systematic. Where "systematic" implies a purposeful organization, "systemic" doesn't refer to something purposefully done.

²⁴ See Katia McClain, "Representations of the Roma in *Buffy* and *Angel*," in *Joss Whedon and Race: Critical Essays*, edited by Mary Ellen Iatropoulos and Lower A. Woodall III (McFarland, 2016), 169–183. There are problematic and negative representations of the Roma in "Passion" 2.17 and "Buffy vs Dracula" 5.1 as folks who curse others or are charlatans. *Angel* continues the motif, with the Romani described as "filthy people" in "The Girl in Question" 5.20 (00:24:46-47). See respectively, "Passion," *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 2, Episode 1, Mutant Enemy, written by Ty King, directed by Michael Gershman, Twentieth Century Fox, aired 24 February 1998; "Buffy vs Dracula," *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 5, Episode 1, Mutant Enemy, written by Marti Noxon, directed by David

Solomon, Twentieth Century Fox, aired 26 September 2000; “The Girl in Question,” *Angel*, Season 5, Episode 20, Mutant Enemy, written by Steven S. DeKnight and Drew Goddard, directed by David Greenwalt, Twentieth Century Fox, aired 5 May 2004.

²⁵ Giles *works* to become the exception. As we move through the series, he comes to support Buffy’s agency and encourage her self-reliance. Contrast his behavior with Wesley Wyndam-Pryce in Season 3 of *Buffy*. For more on this, see James Rocha and Mona Rocha, *Joss Whedon, Anarchist? A Unified Theory of the Films and Television Series* (McFarland, 2019), 150–153.

²⁶ Iatropoulos and Woodall, “Introduction.”

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ “City of,” *Angel*, Season 1, Episode 1, Mutant Enemy, written by Joss Whedon and David Greenwalt, directed by Joss Whedon, Twentieth Century Fox, aired 5 October 1999.

²⁹ Iatropoulos and Woodall, “Introduction.”

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Garcia, “Three Sites,” 44–47, 51.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Shelby, “Is Racism in the ‘Heart’?,” 415–416; Shelby, *Dark Ghettos*. For a similar view, also see Ian Haney-Lopez, “Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination,” 109 *Yale Law Journal* (1999), 1808–1809.

³⁵ Shelby, “Is Racism in the ‘Heart’?,” 417.

³⁶ Bonilla-Silva, “Rethinking Racism,” 467, 474; Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists*, 102, 175; Ahmed, *On Being Included*, 43–50, esp. 44.

³⁷ Marilyn Friedman, “Racism: Paradigms and Moral Appraisal (A Response to Blum),” in *Racism and Philosophy*, edited by Susan E. Babbitt and Sue Campbell (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999) 98–107; Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists*, 102; Better, *Institutional Racism*, 13; Ahmed, *On Being Included*, 43–50. For a contrary position, see: Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to 1990s* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 130; Blum, *I’m Not a Racist, But*, 9, 36–39; Glasgow, “Racism as Disrespect,” 89.

³⁸ For instance, see: Better, *Institutional Racism*, 31.

³⁹ Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists*, 102; Ahmed, *On Being Included*, 43–46.

⁴⁰ “Bad Girls,” *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 3, Episode 14, Mutant Enemy, written by Doug Petrie, directed by Michael Lange, Twentieth Century Fox, aired 9 February 1999.

⁴¹ It is worth noting that Buffy may have been in a similar situation previously, in “Ted,” (*Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 2, Episode 11, Mutant Enemy, written by David Greenwalt and Joss Whedon, directed by Bruce Seth Green, Twentieth Century Fox, aired 8 December 1997). However, there are important

differences at play here. Buffy believes that she may have killed Ted (her mother's then boyfriend), after they engaged in a fight, only to later have Ted reappear (proving he is in fact, a robot). The fight's context is significant: Ted has been engaging in an abusive campaign against Buffy (while pretending to all others to simply be a jovial and good-natured individual), and has even slapped Buffy around a few times already. Importantly, the fight itself started after Ted initiated hitting Buffy. When Buffy fights back, Ted ends up falling down the stairs, and Buffy is taken into custody for questioning. Therefore, this situation is about self-defense; in the episode, Buffy is portrayed as an abuse victim who is isolated and then ends up killing her abuser.

Regardless of these considerations, though, Buffy is horrified at herself: she does not excuse her action, she keeps questioning her motives, and she is very remorseful. Buffy holds that as a Slayer, she should not have killed a human *at all*; she holds onto the principle that taking human life, even if deserved, is not proper. Self-defense or not, Buffy blames herself for Ted's death. As such, prior to the incident with Finch, Buffy has had an experience with taking what she thought was a human life (but was a robot). Thus, while Buffy engaged in reflection about the taking of a human life, she was then absolved from having to critically engage with it further. Consequently, when Faith kills Finch, Buffy is propelled to reevaluate her thoughts on killing humans.

⁴² Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4:428, 79.

⁴³ For a sample of Kant scholars who are worried about this issue, see: Alexander Broadie and Elizabeth M. Pybus, "Kant's Treatment of Animals," *Philosophy* 49.190 (October 1974), 375, 382; Jack Lee, "How Should Animals Be Treated?" *Ethics, Place and Environment* 11.2 (June 2008), 181; Allen W. Wood, "Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 72 (1998), 189–210, at 194.

⁴⁴ "Lie to Me," *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 2, Episode 7, Mutant Enemy, written by Joss Whedon, directed by Joss Whedon, Twentieth Century Fox, aired 3 November 1997.

⁴⁵ "Lie to Me," *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 2, Episode 7, minutes 35:57–36:09.

⁴⁶ "Lie to Me," *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 2, Episode 7, minutes 42:43–42:50.

⁴⁷ "Lie to Me," *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 2, Episode 7, minutes 42:54 start–43:07.

⁴⁸ Consider the case of Harmony Kendall. A Sunnydale student turned vampire, she nevertheless learned to give up human blood (and fed on pig blood) and

despite repeated bad behaviors while human and vampire, Cordelia and Angel still gave Harmony lenience and did not stake her (and Angel even gave her a recommendation letter). Even Angel's vampirism was fully cured through the Blood of Eternity of the Mohra demon, whom Angel fought ("I Will Remember You," *Angel*, Season 1, Episode 8, Mutant Enemy, written by David Greenwalt, directed by David Grossman, Twentieth Century Fox, aired 23 November 1999). In the Buffyverse, there are possibilities to train a vampire into less horrible behavior, as opposed to just staking them.

⁴⁹ Hautsch, "Staking Her Colonial Claim," 8.

⁵⁰ 00:14:24-32, "New Moon Rising," *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 4, Episode 19, Mutant Enemy, written by Marti Noxon, directed by James A. Contner, Twentieth Century, aired 2 May 2000.

⁵¹ "Beauty and the Beasts," *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 3, Episode 4, Mutant Enemy, written by Marti Noxon, directed by James Whitmore, Jr., Twentieth Century, aired 20 October, 1998.

⁵² "Villains," *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 6, Episode 20, Mutant Enemy, written by Marti Noxon, directed by David Solomon, Twentieth Century, aired 14 May 2002.

⁵³ "Potential," 7.12, *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, Season 7, Episode 12, Mutant Enemy, written by Rebecca Rand Kirshner, Twentieth Century, aired 21 January 2003.

⁵⁴ Hautsch, "Staking Her Colonial Claim," 8. Note that in the fifth and sixth season, Buffy still dismisses Spike as simply controlled by a chip. She also engages in abusive behavior toward him, punching him and dehumanizing him even while using him as a sexual partner. Hautsch describes this treatment as imperialist/colonialist. See Hautsch, 8-9.

⁵⁵ Renée Cox, "Got Myself a Soul? The Puzzling Treatment of the Soul in *Buffy*," in *The Truth of Buffy: Essays on Fiction Illuminating Reality*, edited by Emily Dial-Driver, Sally Emmons-Featherston, Jim Ford, and Carolyn Anne Taylor (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2008); Hautsch, "Staking Her Colonial Claim," 6-8.

⁵⁶ Dean A. Kowalski, "Visions of the Soul: Looking Back on *Buffy* and *Angel*," *Slayage* 16.2, Summer/Fall 2018. Available at https://www.whedonstudies.tv/uploads/2/6/2/8/26288593/8_kowalski_slayage_16.2.pdf

(accessed 10 July 2023).

⁵⁷ Kowalski, "Visions of the Soul," 131-132; Gregory Stevenson, *Televised Morality: The Case of Buffy the Vampire Slayer* (Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania: Hamilton Books, 2003).

⁵⁸ Kowalski, “Visions of the Soul,” 132–134; Stacey Abbott, “Walking the fine line between Angel and Angelus,” *Slayage* 3.1, 2003. Available at <http://offline2.buffy.de/www.slayage.tv/PDF/abbott2.pdf> (accessed 10 July 2023).

⁵⁹ Kowalski, “Visions of the Soul,” 137–138; Scott McLaren, “The Evolution of Joss Whedon’s Vampire Mythology and the Ontology of the Soul,” *Slayage* 5.2 (2005). Available at <https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10315/2876/VampireMythology.pdf> (accessed 20 July 2023).

⁶⁰ Kowalski, “Visions of the Soul,” 145–150.

⁶¹ Ibid.

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